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Abstract
I oer one possible explanation of why inertial and gravitational mass are equal in Newtonian
gravitation. I then argue that the explanation given is an example of a kind of explanation
that is not captured by standard philosophical accounts of scientic explanation. Moreover,
this form of explanation is particularly important, at least in physics, because demands for
this kind of explanation are used to motivate and shape research into the next generation of
physical theories.
\What do we mean here by `explanation'? ... This whole issue, which perhaps lies between
nature and sociology, seems to be a bit vague. Quite possibly, an attempt to make the
word explanation more precise may do more harm to the eld [of physics] than good."
-Robert Geroch (1978, pg. 63)
1 Introduction
Consider the following questions, any of which might be heard in the halls of a physics
department.
1. Our best theory of particle physics predicts that in very high energy experiments, which
probe the smallest distance scales, the electromagnetic, weak, and strong forces should
have approximately the same strength. But at these same distance scales, gravitation
is many orders of magnitude weaker. Why is gravity so much weaker than any of the
other forces?
2. The Standard Model of particle physics makes predictions that have been conrmed
to 15 signicant digits (Odom et al., 2006). But the Standard Model's predictions rely
on 19 parameters that are \put in by hand" to agree with experiment; in order for the
Standard Model to make accurate predictions at all, these parameters must be nely
1Thank you to Kyle Stanford and David Malament for helpful remarks on earlier drafts of this paper.
Thank you, also, to the Southern California Philosophy of Physics group, in particular Je Barrett, Craig
Callender, and Tarun Menon, for a spirited and productive discussion of the material presented here.
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tuned. Why do these Standard Model parameters take the values they do, and is there
a sense in which they are \natural" or determined by some underlying mathematical
or physical principle?
3. In Newtonian physics,3 inertial mass (the value m that appears in F = ma) always has
the same value as gravitational mass (the coupling to the gravitational eld, i.e. the
value m that appears in UG = m'G, where 'G is the gravitational potential and UG is
the potential energy of a particle with mass m), even though in principle the theory
distinguishes these masses. This equivalence is empirical: it was rst established (in
slightly dierent terms) by Galileo; at the end of the 19th century, it was tested with
very high precision by Lorand Eotvos. Yet the correspondence seems highly suggestive.
Why are inertial and gravitational mass equal in Newtonian physics?
I need not multiply examples. Each of these is a why question asked in a particular scientic
context (physics). As such, I take it that they are calls for scientic explanation.4 Indeed,
they are why questions of a particularly important sort: these are the kind of questions that
physicists often use to motivate their research projects. Questions 1 and 2 are open and
form the basis of several major contemporary research programs5 in high energy particle
physics and quantum gravity. Question 3, meanwhile, has been settled, or at least, we now
have the theoretical machinery available to provide one sort of answer to it. I claim that the
answer one can now give in response to question 3 is an example of one kind of explanation
that would satisfy the physicists who ask questions 1 and 2. It may not be the only kind of
explanation that physicists would ultimately deem satisfactory, though I think it is an ideal
of the sort of explanation physicists have in mind when they ask questions 1 and 2. My
central goal in this paper will be to examine just what kind of explanation it is.
Before proceeding, however, I should give some context to the present discussion. Over
the last 20 years, since Salmon (1989) proposed a detente between the causal and unica-
tionist accounts of explanation, the idea that some sort of pluralist account of explanation
is necessary to capture the full variety of explanatory phenomena has gained considerable
3I will use the expression \Newtonian theory" interchangeably with \Newtonian physics." In both cases
I mean Newtonian dynamics plus gravitation.
4Perhaps not all calls for explanation take the form of why questions, and perhaps not all why questions
call for explanations. But I claim these why questions do call for explanations.
5I do not mean \research program" in a technical philosophical sense. I just mean that string theorists,
loop quantum gravity theorists, and many particle phenomenologists (in the physicist's sense of phenomenol-
ogy) take these questions to be central to their research.
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support. Salmon's own line was that the causal and unicationist accounts are not inconsis-
tent. Instead, he thought they oer dierent kinds of understanding, corresponding to the
dierent kinds of explanation; in some sense, he thought, both the causal and unicationist
accounts are correct. On Salmon's view, the two accounts together oer a full account of
explanation on which unicationist explanations are \top-down" and causal explanations are
\bottom-up." Any given event or phenomenon can be explained in both ways. But this form
of pluralism is still too limiting: it now seems that some explanations do not t neatly into
either account (see, for instance, Batterman (2002)), and moreover, that some phenomena
that are easily explained using one kind of explanation do not, as Salmon suggests, have
explanations of the other sort.6
More recently, Godfrey-Smith (2003) (following Kuhn (1977)) has suggested a dierent
kind of pluralism, in which what counts as a good explanation can vary depending on sci-
entic context. Explanation in biology need not be the same as explanation in physics, and
explanation in either eld in the early 21st century need not be the same as explanation was
in, say, the 17th century. On this view, it is a mistake (as Geroch suggests above) to attempt
to characterize scientic explanation in advance: what counts as a good explanation in sci-
ence is evolving along with the sciences themselves. I am very sympathetic to this view.
But I take it that two projects remain, even after a pluralistic, contexualist account has
been accepted. The rst project is to identify the working parts of contextualist pluralism:
what makes a particular explanation an appropriate one in a given instance, as an answer
to a particular why question? Certainly, scientic context|i.e. eld of study and historical
moment|determines the array of explanations that are available. But in many scientic
contexts, such as contemporary physics, it seems that more than one form of explanation is
common. Moreover, as Salmon suggests, many phenomena may have explanations of radi-
6I take Fisher (1930)'s explanation of sex ratio in humans as an example of this latter sort. (See also
Skyrms (1996, Ch. 1), where Fisher's work is put in perspective.) A causal explanation can explain why any
individual turned out to have a particular gender, but it cannot explain why the ratio must be what it is.
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cally dierent types.7 The second project, meanwhile, is to identify interesting explanations
used in various contexts and attempt to understand their epistemic virtues (or, perhaps, lack
thereof). The current paper is an example of the second kind of project.
From here I will proceed as follows. I will start by clarifying what question 3 is asking. I
will then sketch what I take the answer to be.8 This question has been answered informally
in a variety of ways since General Relativity (GR) rst appeared in 1915; the answer I will
present here is certainly in the spirit of these standard responses, though it precisies a
number of details about the relationship between mass in GR and Newtonian physics that
are usually left vague. To my knowledge, the form of the answer I will present here is original
and I take it to be of (minor) independent interest. After presenting the explanation I have
in mind, I will turn to the question of whether the explanation I oer here can be understood
within the rubrics of well established accounts of explanation. I will conclude that it cannot.
In the remainder of the paper, I will try to articulate how the present explanation works,
highlighting its distinctive features.
2 Why are inertial and gravitational mass equal in Newtonian gravitation?
As I have said, inertial mass and gravitational mass are conceptually distinct in Newtonian
physics (I will distinguish them here by writing mI for inertial mass and mG for gravitational
mass). Indeed, one would expect them to be unrelated to one another. Inertial mass is
a constant of proportionality in the fundamental dynamical principles of the theory. It
appears in Newton's second law, which states that F = mIa; momentum is dened as
p = mIv; kinetic energy is T = 1=2mIv2. One can think of inertial mass as a measure
of a body's tendency to accelerate under the inuence of an impressed force. Inertial mass
is closely related to inertial motion, which enters Newtonian theory via Newton's rst law.
The rst law states that a body undergoing uniform rectilinear motion will not deviate from
7I would suggest that the problem of identifying appropriate explanations is essentially pragmatic, but
will defer discussion of this point to future work.
8The discussion in the body of the paper is precise, but informal. The technical details of the explanation
are included in an appendix.
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that motion unless acted on by an external force; inertial mass, then, determines a body's
tendency to deviate from uniform rectilinear motion when acted on by an external force,
whether gravitational or otherwise.
Gravitational mass, meanwhile, determines the strength of the gravitational force that
a body exerts on other bodies and, conversely, is exerted on the body by other bodies. It
enters the theory via Newton's law of universal gravitation, which states that given two
bodies with respective gravitational masses
1
mG and
2
mG, each will exert a force of
FG =
G
1
mG
2
mG
r2
on the other, where r is the magnitude of the distance between the bodies' centers of mass and
G is Newton's constant. Equivalently, one can think of gravitational mass as a measure of a
body's response to a background gravitational eld. If a test body9 with gravitational mass
mG is placed in a gravitational potential 'G(r), then the body will have gravitational potential
energy UG(r) = mG'G(r) and will experience a force FG =  mGr'G(r). Gravitational mass
can be thought of (in modern terms) as gravitational charge, in analogy with classical electric
charge. Indeed, the fundamental force equations have exactly the same structure. Given two
bodies with electric charges
1
q and
2
q, Coulomb's law gives that each will exert a force of
FE =
C
1
q
2
q
r2
on the other, where C is Coulomb's constant. Likewise, a test charge q in an electric
potential 'E(r) will have electrical potential energy UE = q'E(r) and will experience a
force of FE =  qr'E(r).
The parallel with electric force is particularly salient here. Suppose one wants to know
the acceleration exhibited by a test particle of charge q and inertial mass mI in an electric
9By test body, I mean a body that is assumed not to contribute to the gravitational eld itself. In other
words, when considering test bodies one neglects the \backreaction" of a body's own gravitational eld.
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potential 'E . Combining Newton's second law with the force law for a test particle in an
electromagnetic eld, one nds that
a =   q
mI
r'E :
In other words, the acceleration depends on the ratio of the charge to the inertial mass of the
body, both of which are freely varying, independent objects. One can nd in nature bodies
with many dierent values for the ratio q=mI . Meanwhile, if one performs the identical cal-
culation to determine the acceleration due to gravity (given a xed gravitational potential),
one likewise nds,
a =  mG
mI
r'G: (2.1)
Again, the acceleration depends on the ratio of two values: the gravitational and inertial
masses. Given the structural similarities between the gravitational and electric cases, one
should expect to go out into the world and nd bodies with a wide array of dierent values for
the ratiomG=mI . After all, (a) how much a body will tend to deviate from rectilinear motion
given an external force and (b) the strength of that external force should be independent
quantities (as they are when considering electric force). But it turns out that when we
start looking into how bodies behave in a gravitational potential, we nd something quite
dierent. Given any body at all, the ratio mG=mI always takes the same value: choosing
the natural units, we always nd that mG=mI = 1.
Given this background, the explanandum can be stated as follows: all evidence suggests
that, given any body, the gravitational and inertial masses of that body can be demon-
strated to be equal, despite the fact that Newtonian theory gives no reason to expect these
two masses to be related. In other words, we want to understand why gravitational mass and
inertial mass appear to be identical in Newtonian theory. In some ways this is an unusual
why question (at least with respect to standard accounts of explanation), so I want to spend
some time up front focusing on its distinctive features. First o, it is a question about a
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general observational feature of the world, but it is expressed in the terms of a specic phys-
ical theory. In other words, the question takes the Newtonian concepts of gravitational and
inertial mass for granted. One can express the observational fact without reference to the
Newtonian theory|Galileo rst described the phenomenon that all bodies fall at the same
rate, irrespective of mass, before Newton was born|but when one does so, the question
does not arise. One might, perhaps, wonder about the apparent universality of free fall in
other contexts or even quite generally: after all, Galileo's results certainly conicted with
the Aristotelian expectation, so one might well have demanded an explanation for Galileo's
observations in the context of Aristotelian physics, too. But without the background concep-
tual machinery of Newtonian physics, the question is dierent. I am interested in a specic
question about the world, expressed within the Newtonian framework. It seems to me that
questions 1 and 2 are similar in this regard, mutatis mutandis.
This rst feature suggests a second feature. Although the question is posed within the
Newtonian framework, and cannot be quite the same question if posed in other contexts, it
explicitly cannot be answered within the Newtonian framework. As we have seen, the New-
tonian concepts of gravitational and inertial mass are distinct. That the two masses always
take the same value for any given body is contingent, though suggestive, within Newtonian
physics. It is this contingency that forms the explanandum under consideration. The ques-
tion would be quite dierent if inertial and gravitational mass were natively identied within
the theory, or if the theory itself gave some indication for why their coincidence was only ap-
parent. The reason the question arises is that the observed equivalence cannot be explained
within the Newtonian framework. But this means that any appropriate answer will have
to go beyond Newtonian physics. So we have a question posed in one theory that can only
be adequately answered by appealing to another, presumably more general or fundamental,
theory.
But what form could such an answer take? Einstein (1920) claimed that the observed
equivalence between gravitational and inertial mass was an important factor in his devel-
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opment of GR, and that it can be taken as evidence in favor of the \general postulate of
relativity." The principle that the two mass concepts should be identied, or equivalently
the idea that free fall does not depend on mass, is often called the weak equivalence principle
and continues to play a central role in some presentations of GR (see, for instance, Weinberg
(1972, ch. 1)). From this point of view, the observed equivalence is explained by asserting
that in a supervening theory (GR), no distinction is made between the two masses. Inertial
and gravitational masses are simply the same. But there is something strange, and poten-
tially misleading, about this answer to the original question. The reason for the diculty is
that a more accurate account of the situation in GR, using only concepts native to GR itself,
would be to say that there is only inertial mass. It is not that gravitational mass is explicitly
identied with inertial mass, but rather than gravitational mass has been stricken from the
theory altogether. There is no gravitational potential in GR; nor is there a gravitational
force. And so it makes no sense to ask how a body responds to a gravitational potential or
how strongly it exerts a gravitational force on another body.10 To say that gravitational and
inertial masses are identied in GR is simply a confusion.11 When one attempts to answer
the original question by appealing to some supposed equivalence between the two kinds of
mass in GR, one mixes terms from two theories in a way that is dubious and confusing.
These considerations suggest another response to our original question. Given that grav-
itational mass does not make sense in GR, one might say that the question turns out to be
an error. We used to think that gravitation was a force (one might say), and that a body's
gravitational mass determined the magnitude of that force exerted by and on the body. But
now we know that gravitation is not a force at all and so questions about gravitational mass
do not make any sense. This type of response is intended to dissolve, rather than answer,
the question, by directing the questioner to a textbook on GR. But I claim that this kind of
10This point is put clearly, for instance, by Sachs (1976), though it has not always been recognized by the
physics community, as Weinberg (1972) attests.
11Einstein, of course, can be excused for making statements to this eect: he was building a new theory
and, in Neurath's boat fashion, needed to work with what he had in order to make himself understood (and
in order to understand what he was doing himself).
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response is unsatisfying. First, the question was asked in a specic framework; to say that
that framework is no longer widely accepted is irrelevant. Second, even if one accepts that
GR supercedes Newtonian physics, and one accepts moreover that gravitational mass does
not exist in GR, the question remains and should have an answer. In Newtonian physics,
which everyone accepts as a predictively accurate theory, there are two dierent kinds of
mass. As such, I can point to two kinds of roles that one might expect mass to play. Sup-
posing that GR is correct that gravitational mass does not make sense, why does it seem
that inertial mass gets peeled apart into two separate things? Or equivalently, if we limit
attention to gravitation on the scales at which Newtonian physics is eective, why do we nd
gravitational mass to be a useful concept, and moreover, why is it equal to inertial mass?12
I think this discussion helps to clarify both what question was originally being asked and
what kind of answer would be appropriate. We have two xed points to navigate between.
First, the question is such that it cannot be answered by the Newtonian theory. New physics
is required. But second, it is a question that needs to be answered in the terms in which
it was asked, i.e. within the Newtonian framework. As we have seen, using Newtonian
terms within the framework of GR leads to inconsistencies and serious confusion, while
using concepts native to GR at best allows a dissolutive response, rather than an answer, to
the question. With these two points in mind, one might rephrase the question once again,
as follows. Given that we now believe GR to have superseded Newtonian theory as our best
description of large-scale dynamics and gravitation,13 why are gravitational and inertial mass
12Curiously, one can already imagine giving the same response to question 1: why should we compare
gravitation to the other three forces? After all, we already know that there is no such thing as gravitational
force! But this answer would be equally unsatisfying in that context, for the same reason: gravitation is
conceived of as a force in modern particle physics, which is at least part of the diculty in making quantum
eld theory and GR mesh. It is easy to imagine a similar response, too, to question 2: it may well turn out
that these parameters are not important to our next class of theories. I think this serves to underline the
curious character of the questions above: they are all expressed in the language of one theory, but one fully
expects that the answer will come from a theory in which the terms of the question may not make any sense.
13Some readers might balk at this point and argue that GR cannot provide any kind of explanations
whatsoever if it is not true. I do not share the intuition that only true theories have explanatory power. But
I do not think this issue is relevant here. Everything I say in what follows can be recast in conditional form:
explanations of the form \If GR were true, then..." are perfectly sucient for a discussion of what kinds of
explanation are possible in science.
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equal in Newtonian theory?14 In this particular case, since it turns out that gravitational
mass does not make sense in GR, there is an additional question hidden within the original
question: if GR is right, why does Newtonian theory support two concepts of mass in the
rst place?
To answer these questions, one needs to show, in detail, how Newtonian theory relates
to GR. One needs to show why, if GR is true, Newtonian theory is such an eective theory,
at least at certain distance/energy scales. One way of doing this would be to show that
Newtonian theory can be reached from GR as an appropriate limit that captures (within
GR) the circumstances in which Newtonian theory seems so eective.15 This observation
suggests yet another renement of the original question. What we are really interested in
is the following: Given that we now believe GR to have superseded Newtonian theory, then
why, insofar as Newtonian theory is a limiting case of GR, are inertial and gravitational
mass equal in Newtonian theory? I maintain that this reformulation captures of the spirit
14Rephrasing the question in this way is only possible when one can point to the superseding theory. In
the cases of questions 1 and 2, no superseding theory is known. These questions might be rephrased in terms
of a future possible theory, or as a statement of a certain kind of research objective. One is looking for a new
theory T that can tell us why, given that theory T supersedes the Standard Model (say), the parameters in
the Standard Model take the particular values that they are observed to take.
15Many philosophers have questioned when and whether it is possible to show that an old theory reduces
to a new theory (in the philosopher's parlance) or a new theory reduces to an old theory (in the language
of working physicists) in the sense I have in mind here of a new theory explaining why an old theory
worked. Nagel (1961, 1970), for instance, treated intertheoretic reduction as explanation (in the deductive-
nomological (DN) sense) in a way that bears a rough family resemblance to what I am thinking of; Nickles
(1973), meanwhile, argues that often explanatory reductions are not possible at all (at least in the DN sense).
Curiously, Nickles identies Newtonian physics and relativity theory as a prime example of a reduction
relationship that is not an explanation in the DN sense, but rather a collection of rough intertheoretic
relations. It seems to me that if any intertheoretic relationship deserves to be called deductive, it is the
relation between Newtonian theory and GR. But I do not intend to enter a debate on intertheoretic reduction
here. Instead, I want to distinguish identifying reduction and explanation (as Nagel does) from a more
ambiguous demand that a new theory explain, at least in some sense, why our old theories succeeded. One
way of cashing this requirement out is to say that a new theory cannot make predictions that are inconsistent
with the successes of previous theories (in which case the new theory will at least reveal regularities captured
by the old theory). At least in physics, if a new theory is inconsistent with the success of an old theory, it
is perceived as a major diculty for the new theory. One can see this tension, for instance, in the relation
between quantum mechanics and Newtonian physics, where there is a real worry that quantum mechanics
makes predictions regarding, for instance, superpositions of medium-sized dry goods that do not conform well
with classical expectations (or ordinary experience). This apparent inability to recover Newtonian theory
from quantum mechanics, though not a barrier to the acceptance of quantum mechanics, remains a central
problem for (some) working physicists. In any case, in the present example such an explanation is possible,
and I maintain that parallel explanations are demanded by each of the questions asked in the introduction.
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in which the original question was asked, and moreover, we nally have a question that is
precise enough to answer. It is now clear that the answer would involve trying to show
that if Newtonian theory is taken as the limit of GR in the appropriate way, then Newtonian
theory does support two concepts of mass, and moreover, that for any body these two masses
must be equal. In other words, one shows that gravitational mass arises in some way in the
limiting process, and that the result must be equal to inertial mass.16
It turns out that it is possible to perform this procedure exactly as described. (See
appendix A.) There is a precise sense in which Newtonian theory is a limit of GR (Kunzle,
1976; Ehlers, 1981; Malament, 1986a).17 It involves a two step process. One begins by
considering a one-parameter family of relativistic spacetimes, parametrized by some variable
. , at the present level of discussion, can be taken to reect the inverse of the \speed of
16At the very least, the answer sketched would be responsive to the question when reformulated as relative
to GR. It seems to me that, given GR and the relationship between GR and Newtonian physics, the correct
way of thinking about Newtonian physics is through the lens of GR. But not all philosophers agree: there
is another way of thinking according to which Newtonian physics is an entirely unrelated (and false) theory
of spacetime and gravitation. From this perspective, one might try to relate the theories and thus explain
the empirical success of Newtonian theory by looking for various limiting relations between Newtonian laws
and the laws of GR such that, under certain circumstances, particular Newtonian laws can be understood to
be approximately true. All I can say in response is that I agree that if one understands Newtonian physics
in this way, then the explanation I oer is not satisfying. But I disagree that this is the most natural way
of understanding Newtonian physics. In particular, it seems to me that the relationship that one does get
between Newtonian physics and GR by understanding the former as a limiting case of the latter is highly
desirable from the point of view of practicing physics (and philosophy of physics). But see also footnote 17.
17This footnote is in some sense a continuation of footnote 16; it also addresses a possible worry about
so-called \counterfactual" explanations. As I have said, there is a way of thinking about Newtonian gravi-
tation in light of GR according to which describing the sense in which Newtonian theory is a limit of GR is
tantamount to describing the experimental conditions under which it is appropriate to use Newtonian laws
for purposes of approximation. This is not what I have in mind. When I describe Newtonian theory as a
limiting case of GR, I mean that given a xed background manifold, (a) there is a precise sense in which
classical spacetime structure on that manifold can be understood as the limit of a sequence of relativistic
spacetime structures, and (b) when one takes this limit (with appropriate background assumptions), one
recovers the correct Newtonian laws in toto on the resulting classical spacetime. (See appendix A.) There
is at least one place in which the two ways of thinking make contact, however. If, rather than consider-
ing experimental settings in which particular Newtonian laws are appropriate approximations, one instead
considers the experimental circumstances under which one would be unable to identify failures of absolute
simultaneity (perhaps because the apparatus is too coarse grained to detect the nite speed of light), then
it is appropriate (from an experimental point of view) to assume that spacetime has a classical, Galilean
structure. And if one were to make such an assumption, it would then be appropriate to take the limit I
have described to derive the relevant approximate laws|hence \motivating" the explanatory power of the
limit, hopefully even for a reader who is disinclined to think of Newtonian theory natively as a limiting case
of GR. I also take it that describing the limit in this way should moderate worries that the limit \as c goes to
innity" cannot be explanatory because it is counterfactual, since one can understand the limit as describing
the case where for all we can tell c is innite (as was the situation in 1687).
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light"18 in each of the spacetimes. By constructing this family of spacetimes carefully, one can
consider the limit that the spacetimes approach as  approaches 0 (corresponding to taking
the speed of light to innity). The result is a degenerate \classical" spacetime with many of
the characteristic features of Newtonian physics: space is always at and Euclidean; there is
a unique sense of space at a time and absolute simultaneity holds; the spacetime is Galilean
relativistic, which means that (1) measurements of elapsed time and the distance between
simultaneous events will be the same for all observers, irrespective of their motion and (2)
there is no absolute standard of rest. But we have not yet recovered Newtonian physics.
Rather, we have reached an intermediate point between GR and Newtonian physics, which
I will call geometrized Newtonian theory.19;20 Geometrized Newtonian theory is classical in
the sense that the spacetimes it permits are classical (as just described). But in geometrized
Newtonian theory, gravitation is still geometrical: the geometry of spacetime is curved,
with curvature determined by the distribution of matter in the universe, and gravitational
eects are manifestations of the resulting geometry. In this sense geometrized Newtonian
theory is like GR, though with a dierent spacetime structure and with dierent fundamental
equations. Importantly, since gravitation is geometrical rather than a force between bodies,
gravitational mass does not make any more sense in the context of geometrized Newtonian
theory than in GR.
To see where gravitational mass comes from, we need to take the second step in the lim-
iting process. This step makes use of a theorem known as the Trautman Recovery Theorem
18There is an abuse of language, here. Really,  parametrizes something about the metrical structure of
the spacetime, specically how wide the light cones are at a point. But the widths of the light cones indicates
how null vectors, which are the possible tangent vectors for the wordlines traversed by light, relate to the
timelike and spacelike vectors in the spacetime. Hence wider lightcones indicate \faster" light.
19Geometrized Newtonian theory is sometimes called Newton-Cartan theory. It was rst developed during
a lecture course by Elie Cartan in the early 1920s, as an attempt to understand how Newtonian gravitation
related to GR (Cartan, 1923, 1924). (See also Friedrichs (1927).) Strictly speaking geometrized Newtonian
theory, rather than standard Newtonian physics, is the classical limit of GR.
20It may be helpful to emphasize, here, that geometrized Newtonian theory is not a model within GR
that is somehow suggestive of classical physics. It is an independent theory with the empirical content of
Newtonian physics. Indeed, a classical spacetime as described here is not and could not be a relativistic
spacetime because it does not have an appropriate metric structure. We really have left GR when we arrive
at the classical limit. As we shall see, there is a strong sense in which standard Newtonian physics can be
recovered from geometrized Newtonian theory, and so the \Newton" in its name is well justied.
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(Malament, 2010, Prop. 4.2.5), due to Andrzej Trautman. Trautman's theorem tells us that,
given a classical spacetime of the sort found in geometrized Newtonian theory, satisfying cer-
tain conditions, one can nd21 (1) another spacetime that is at,22 and (2) a scalar eld 'G
that satises Poisson's equation (i.e. that has the dynamical relationship to the distribution
of matter in the universe that Newton's theory predicts for the gravitational potential) and
which is such that for any free (inertial) massive test point particle,
a =  r'G:23 (2.2)
Thus, under certain circumstances, we can recover a at spacetime and a gravitational poten-
tial 'G that has just the relations to both the distribution of matter in the universe and the
dynamics of a particle that we would expect from Newtonian physics, and moreover, in this
at spacetime, the particle trajectories determined relative to the gravitational eld agree
with the particle trajectories as determined by the geometrized theory in the initial curved
spacetime. More loosely, one nds a at spacetime and gravitational eld that \makes the
same predictions" as the geometrized theory. We have now recovered full-blown, standard
Newtonian physics as a limit of GR.
I want to draw attention to an important feature of Eq. (2.2). It is a derived relation be-
tween the acceleration of a particle and the gradient of the gravitational potential. Compare
Eq. (2.2) with Eq. (2.1). They dier by a proportionality term, mG=mI . In other words, Eq.
(2.2) is just what we get if we set mI = mG in (2.1). In the process of recovering Newtonian
theory from GR, we have shown that gravitational and inertial mass must be equal. An-
other way of getting to the same conclusion would be as follows. Eq. (2.2) just tells us the
relationship between acceleration and the gravitational potential. The gravitational mass
was dened as the coupling to the gravitational eld: it is the constant of proportionality
21See theorem A.4 for details of this claim, and for a precise statement of the conditions a (geometrized)
classical spacetime needs to satisfy in order to recover standard Newtonian theory, which are not trivial.
22A classical spacetime as considered by geometrized Newtonian theory is generally curved, though space
is always at. In standard Newtonian physics, spacetime taken as a whole has to be at.
23Here I am using the notation of standard Newtonian physics.
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moderating the relationship between force and the gravitational eld. If we use F = mIa,24
we nd that the force on a massive test point particle arising from the gravitational potential
'G is
F = mIa =  mIr'G: (2.3)
Eq. (2.3) tells us directly that the coupling to the gravitational eld in Newtonian physics
is given by the inertial mass. The reason that gravitational and inertial mass are always
equal is that gravitational mass simply is inertial mass. And thus we have an answer to the
original question (suitably formulated).
3 What have I just done?
Now that I have oered an answer to one of my questions, I can ask what kind of explanation
I have given. It seems clear without further argument that this explanation is not a causal
explanation, in any of the senses of causal explanation that have been articulated over
the last few decades.25 It likewise does not t into any of the earlier statistical accounts of
explanation, such as the statistical relevance account of explanation or the inducto-statistical
account.26 For one, in all of these cases (causal/mechanical, SR, IS), one explains an event or
perhaps a class of events. The explanation under consideration in this paper regards a more
general feature of the world, in particular as it relates to a specic theory.27 For another,
the present explanation is (at least roughly) an argument ; usually, causal explanations take
the form of a narrative of events that lead to the event to be explained. In the remainder
24It might be worth emphasizing that F = mIa holds for massive point particles generally in GR, ge-
ometrized Newtonian theory, and standard Newtonian gravitation. Sometimes one hears that \GR does not
have forces, whereas Newtonian physics does," but this is not correct. There are forces in GR; the dierence
with Newtonian physics is that gravitation is not a force in GR. One way of seeing why this should be is
that the worldlines of massive particles under the inuence of only gravitational eects are non-accelerating,
which means that the force acting on them (in GR) vanishes.
25Some prominent examples are of course Salmon (1984), but also Cartwright (1983) andWoodward (2003).
Strevens (2004, 2008) also oers a kind of causal account of explanation, though his \kairetic account" also
includes some of the desirable features of the unicationist account.
26For more on either of these, see (Salmon, 1989).
27See, too, Kitcher (1989, Sec. 3.3) for more on the idea that the causal account has diculty with
explanations of theoretical regularities, as opposed to propositions concerning individual events.
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of this section, I will focus on two other prominent accounts of explanation that, at least
prima facie, have a better chance of capturing the kind of explanation I gave in the previous
section: the deductive-nomological (DN) account and the unicationist account.28
3.1 The Deductive-Nomological Account
The DN account of explanation, originally proposed by Hempel and Oppenheim (1948), was
long the received view of explanation. On this account, an explanation is a (logical, rst-
order) argument by which the thing to be explained, the explanandum, is deduced from a
set of true premises, the explanans. It is taken to be necessary that the explanans include
at least one law of nature; generally, it will also include particulars such as initial conditions
or boundary conditions. The thing to be explained is a proposition. The intuition is that
an explanation is a demonstration of law-like expectability. To explain a proposition is to
show that one could expect it to be true, given the laws of nature and some given set of
circumstances.29
Does the explanation I give in section 2 t the DN mold? It certainly has many of
the central features of a DN explanation. The explanation consists of an argument by
which the explanandum is derived. The explanans is perhaps a bit broad: all of the central
28Batterman (2002) also discusses a form of explanation that is not well-treated by the causal and uni-
cationist accounts. He dubs it \asymptotic explanation." I think that he has correctly identied a form
of explanation that the received accounts miss; however, I want to emphasize that the present example is
strikingly dierent from the examples Batterman oers. Asymptotic explanation involves explanations of
\universality"|properties that families of systems have at a given distance scale, irrespective of their mi-
croscopic details. His most familiar example concerns phase changes: virtually all substances undergo phase
changes (from gas to liquid, liquid to solid, etc.), even though they have dramatically dierent microscopic
properties. The explanation of such universal features involves the renormalization group, which is a method
for moving between dierent levels of description of a physical system. The form of explanation described
here relies on a very dierent kind of limiting procedure and concerns relations between theories, not between
distance scales.
Given the importance of the renormalization group in particle physics, it may well turn out that the answers
to questions 1 and 2 described at the beginning of this paper will turn out to look more like Batterman's
examples. (This is especially likely for question 2.) But I do not think this is a problem for what follows.
What is important is that there are cases in which the kind of explanation I am describing is decidedly not
asymptotic explanation.
29See, as ever, Salmon (1989). I am glossing over many diculties concerning what might count as a law
of nature and what kind of deduction is necessary (for instance, are all explanations deductions in rst-order
logic?).
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principles of GR must be included in order to set up the limiting process necessary to recover
geometrized Newtonian theory. But among these principles are several law-like propositions,
and at least one law plays a central role in the explanation insofar as F = mIa enters at the
end of the story to show that inertial mass provides the coupling of a body to the Newtonian
gravitational potential.30 Finally, there is a strong sense in which the argument's explanatory
power comes from the fact that the result is derived from these central principles of GR,
which means that the explanation is nomological in an important way.
But not all is well. This explanation poses some diculties for the DN model, too. First,
the present explanandum is most naturally expressed as a proposition in second-order logic.
We are trying to explain why in all propositions concerning inertial and gravitational mass
(or, in all instances of Newton's force law), the two values appear to be equal. Hence we
are required to quantify over sentences of the logic. In rst-order logic, it is not possible
to express the full force of the conclusion: one can show that in any particular instance,
gravitational mass is equal to inertial mass, but not that inertial mass is always equal to
gravitational mass, which is what was demanded. Is this an insurmountable problem for
the DN model? As typically described (as, for instance, in Salmon (1989)), the DN account
begins with a rst-order logic. But I do not see that rst-order deductions are a necessary
feature of the account; one can easily imagine extending the account to include more general
deductions. In any case, a second-order derivation is certainly in the spirit of the DN model.
A second worry, however, is more troubling. At issue is the language in which the
deduction is to be performed. If one were to begin with a language consisting only of terms
readily interpreted in GR, then gravitational mass would not appear and so the proposition
\inertial and gravitational mass are (always) equal" could not even be expressed. Conversely,
one might begin with an augmented language that includes gravitational mass terms and
then endeavor to show that gravitational mass is always equal to inertial mass via a deduction
in this augmented language. But it is dicult to see how to interpret such an augmented
30Other laws, such as Einstein's equation, must also be included in the explanans because they are necessary
for constructing the limit.
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language. In any case GR by itself would not provide a model for the language, which means
that even if the deduction were to succeed, it would not follow that one had derived the
explanandum by appeal to GR alone. Either way it seems that an essential part of the
explanation cannot be captured within the DN framework.
So the present explanation bears some family resemblance to DN explanations, though
it does not have just the form described by Hempel and Oppenheim (because it requires
second-order logic). More troubling, the DN account does not naturally permit the nal
(important) step of the explanation. All that said, if one were committed to the claim that
all explanations, or at least all deductive explanations, need to t the DN model, it may be
possible to extend the model to include the present example. Alternatively, if disinclined to
extend the DN model, one might bite the bullet and claim that the example does not have
any explanatory power. I do not want to make either of these moves, however. Insofar as I
already accept a pluralistic view about explanation, I do not see any virtues in a procrustean
reading of the present explanation as an example of DN explanation.
But suppose that one is not convinced that the two concerns I have raised pose problems
for a DN reading of the present example. Even so, many writers have pointed out that
Hempel and Oppenheim oer neither necessary nor sucient conditions for an argument to
be explanatory (Godfrey-Smith, 2003; Salmon, 1989; Kitcher, 1989). In other words, even
if the present explanation does t the DN model, it does not follow that it is explanatory
because it ts that model. One still needs to give an account of what makes a given ar-
gument explanatory, even if it has a law as a necessary premise. A prominent attempt to
describe what additionally may be required to make an argument explanatory is given by
the unicationist account of explanation, which I will turn to presently.
3.2 The Unicationist Account
Kitcher (1989) provides the authoritative manifesto on the unicationist account of expla-
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nation, so I will focus on the version of the account given there.31 The basic idea of the
unicationist account of explanation is that science aims to explain phenomena by showing
how a phenomenon ts into a unied systematization of our beliefs. Kitcher makes this idea
precise in the following way. Suppose that K is the set of all statements endorsed by the
scientic community. An acceptable explanation is a member of the explanatory store over
K, denoted E(K). How can we characterize the members of E(K)? First, we say that E(K)
is a set of arguments by which some members of K are derived from other members of K.
But in general there will be many such sets of arguments. To pick one, Kitcher introduces
general argument patterns, ordered triples consisting of (1) a schematic argument, which
are sequences of sentences with key terms replaced by dummy variables (i.e. sequences of
schematic sentences); (2) sets of sets of lling instructions corresponding to each schematic
argument, where a given set of lling instructions tells you how to ll in the dummy variables
of a schematic sentence; and (3) a classication of the schematic argument, which tells you
which of the sentences in the argument are supposed to count as premises and which are
conclusions. One general argument pattern is more stringent than another if its classication
and the structure of its schematic sentences together make it more dicult to instantiate.
Given this machinery, Kitcher says that E(K) consists of the (not necessarily unique)32 min-
imal set of maximally stringent general argument patterns from which a maximal number
of conclusions can be drawn. More roughly, one wants to nd the smallest subset of K from
which the other members of K can be derived, using the fewest possible stringent argument
patterns.
As on the DN account, an explanation on the unicationist account is an argument.33 But
31For more on the history of the unicationist account, see Kitcher (1989) and Salmon (1989), as well as
references therein.
32See Kitcher (1989, pg. 435). In general, Kitcher seems to think that the explanatory store over K may
not be determined by the constraints given. In historical cases, however, he claims that these constraints
are mutually sucient to determine the explanatory store of K.
33Depending on how strictly one construes the constraints on what counts as an argument for the uni-
cationist account, the second worry above, regarding how to understand the language of the argument, may
carry over. I will proceed by assuming that the unicationist account allows some exibility about what
counts as a permissible argument.
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the unicationist account oers an additional set of constraints on the kinds of arguments
that count as explanatory, above and beyond the conditions of the DN account. It is not
sucient (or necessary) that a given conclusion be derived from a set of premises including a
law, as in the DN model; now, an argument is explanatory if it is a member of the explanatory
store of a set of statements endorsed by the scientic community.34 To understand whether
the explanation in section 2 is a unicationist explanation, then, we want to determine
whether we should expect it to be in the explanatory store over K. There are several
reasons to think that it should not be.
First, it is not clear that \gravitational mass and inertial mass are equal" is a member
of K|which would mean that it is not even a candidate explanandum. Kitcher assumes
that K is deductively closed and consistent. Thus, if the statements of GR are members of
K, then \there is no such thing as gravitational mass" is also a member of K, ruling out
\gravitational mass and inertial mass are equal". Perhaps one can relativize statements in
K to theories, i.e., consider statements of the form \in such and such theory, X" as members
of K. But this seems like a strange move for a unicationist to make. It seems more in
the spirit of the unicationist approach to skip over explanations of such uniformities in the
Newtonian context and go right to explaining the motion of individual bodies in a way in
which one never introduces the Newtonian concept of gravitational mass at all. Indeed, on
Kitcher's account of reduction, one would reduce Newtonian gravitation to GR by showing
that the general argument patterns of Newtonian gravitation can be recovered from and
extended as general argument patterns of GR. But then one would not expect to be able
to explain features of the world that can only be expressed in the Newtonian framework,
because the very goal of the reduction would be to move one's explanatory arguments out
of the Newtonian framework and into GR. The ideal would be able to explain all of the
34On Kitcher's account, one would add an \only if" to this last sentence. But if we adopt a pluralist view
of explanation on which some, but not necessarily all, explanations are unicationist explanations then we
want to understand the condition of membership in E(K), as dened by Kitcher, to be only a sucient
condition. A given explanation may be explanatory by virtue of being in E(K), but it is possible that there
are other kinds of explanations as well.
19
phenomena that can be explained by Newtonian physics with GR alone, eschewing the
(exclusively) Newtonian argument patterns altogether.
Another worry comes from the opposite direction. Even if K were construed in such a
way that the explanandum were in K, it is still not clear that the explanation I have given
would be included in the explanatory store. For one, even if you neglect explanations of the
sort I have given, you can still explain all the same phenomena in the world. That is, adding
an additional singular argument of the sort I have given makes the explanatory store larger,
without adding any payo in terms of explanations of particulars. Given the conditions on
choosing E(K), one could conclude that the explanation I have given should not be in E(K)
even if the explanandum were included, since if the explanation were included, E(K) would
violate the minimality condition.
A third worry is more general. It is dicult to see what kind of argument pattern is
being executed in the present example. The thing to be explained is a singular feature of the
Newtonian theory. Neither the explanandum nor the explanation itself can be schematized
without losing its essential character. One might be able to schematize the argument by re-
construing it as an argument concerning the inertial and gravitational masses for particular
bodies, and then include a general argument pattern by which one shows that for any given
body, the inertial and gravitational masses are identical. But it is not clear that such expla-
nations answer the original question. Really we want to know why inertial and gravitational
mass are always the same, not why they happen to take the same value in any variety of
situations.
I think that these points suggest that the explanation I have given is an awkward t
with the unicationist account of explanation, too. Once again, this does not mean that
the unicationist account cannot be adapted to t the explanation I have given. I think it
probably can. Indeed, it is hard to prove that a given explanation, if successful, is not a
member of the maximally unied set of arguments over a set of beliefs. My point is rather that
to make the present explanation t with the details of Kitcher's account, some adaptation
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of the unicationist position is likely necessary. More importantly, even if one can nd a
modied unicationist account that would t more naturally with the present explanation,
it is not clear that it would do justice to the explanation I have given. In other words, it does
not seem that the reason that the explanation I have given is explanatory has anything to do
with the fact that it is an instantiation of a general, stringent, and unied argument pattern.
Indeed, I have suggested that it is not an instantiation of a general argument pattern at
all|it is a singular explanation of a general feature of Newtonian theory.
If anything, attempting to adapt the unicationist picture to include explanations of
the present sort threatens to gloss over the important features of an explanation that are
not otherwise native to the unicationist account of explanation. I would rather say that
very many explanations in science have the character that Kitcher describes: they consist of
arguments that are explanatory by virtue of how they t some particular or regularity into
a systematized body of knowledge. I nd Kitcher's analysis of his own examples convincing,
and I think that a broad class of explanations in physics t well with the unicationist picture
of explanation. Modifying the unicationist account, which gets so many interesting cases
right, seems counterproductive. What we have here is simply a dierent kind of explanation.
4 Let a thousand owers bloom
So far, I have argued that the explanation given in section 2 is neither a causal explanation
nor any kind of statistical explanation. It is, at least roughly, a deductive argument, though
it cannot easily be made to t the strict logical structure demanded by the DN model. Even
if it could be made to t with the DN model (or if the DN model could be expanded to
include such explanations), one would still owe an account of why this particular deductive-
nomological argument is explanatory, given that the Hempel-Oppenheim criteria are not
sucient alone. The leading candidate to provide the additional sucient conditions for
deductive arguments to count as explanatory is the unicationist account; I have argued,
however, that as presented by Kitcher (1989), the unicationist account does not allow
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for explanations of the sort I have given. Indeed, the trouble is not necessarily with the
unicationist account; rather, the explanation I have given is simply not explanatory by
virtue of its status as an instantiation of a maximally unied argument pattern. It should
be clear from my remarks in section 1 that I do not take these accounts' inability to deal
with the present explanation as an argument against the accounts. I have simply presented
a scientic explanation of a dierent sort (and there are many possible sorts).
The remaining work is simply to identify some of the features of the present explanation
and to try to characterize what makes it explanatory. I have identied the most important
features along the way, but it seems worthwhile to tie them together now. First, as we
have seen, the present explanation is an argument (broadly construed). But it is a singular
argument: it explains a broad generality in Newtonian physics and there are no other gen-
eralities that can be explained by the same argument.35 Moreover, the explanation requires
second-order logic to capture the spirit in which the question is asked. Most importantly,
there is a crucial step of translation involved in the theory that makes it dicult to fully
capture in purely logical form. This translation is necessary because the question is asked
in the language of one theory (indeed, it only makes sense in that theory), but it is of a
form that a fortiori cannot be answered without appealing to physics that goes beyond the
theory within which it is asked. Meanwhile, it demands an answer on its own terms: it is
not enough to dissolve the question by appealing to a superseding theory. The explanatory
demand is to show how, given some superseding theory, a general fact within an old theory
that seemed unexplainable given the apparatus of that theory is really necessary or to be
expected. The explanation consists in lling in the details of a general response to such
questions along the following lines: such and such is the case in this theoretical framework
because really we believe this other, superseding theory.
I take it that the explanatory work here is done by spelling out how two theories relate
35That is not to say that there are not other generalities of Newtonian theory that can be explained by the
limiting process I have described. There are. Two examples are the fact that space is at in Newtonian theory
(Malament, 1986b) and that momentum is conserved. But the explanations for these dier in important
details from the explanation I have given, even though they are also explained via the limit from GR.
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to one another and showing that, taken as a limit of a superior theory, an old theory must
display the regularity in question. It is worth emphasizing again that for this kind of expla-
nation to be satisfactory, one needs to understand the original question in a specic way, as
in some sense relative to the superseding theory, (though as I have argued, this is often the
most natural way of understanding theories that have been superseded). For these reasons,
one might call explanations of the sort I have given intertheoretic explanations, or perhaps
aspirational explanations, since the questions that call for such explanations are often de-
mands for new theories. This last feature reiterates something I have already suggested, that
such explanations are particularly important: these explanations guide inquiry by setting
out the questions that a new theory is expected to answer (once appropriate translation work
into the old theory has been done). That said, they are not the only kinds of explanation
that could serve in this role. And as Geroch suggests in the above quoted passage, to say
any more would be a mistake.
A Technical Details of Answer to Question 3
In the body of the paper I oer an answer to the question, \Why are inertial and gravitational
mass equal in Newtonian physics?" This answer concerns the sense in which standard New-
tonian gravitational theory can be understood as a limit of GR, via geometrized Newtonian
theory. The explanation oered in the main text is reasonably precise, but non-technical;
here I oer the technical details of that argument. This appendix is not intended as a
complete or pedagogical introduction to geometrized or covariant formulations of Newtonian
gravitation (or GR, the treatment of which will be especially brief). I will provide only a
brief, formal review of geometrized and covariant standard Newtonian theory and GR to
establish notation and terminology. For a systematic treatment of these subjects, including
proofs of the theorems stated here and an explanation of the \abstract index notation" I
will use throughout, see Malament (2010, Esp. Ch. 4). For a systematic treatment of the
sense in which geometrized Newtonian theory arises as a limit from GR, see Kunzle (1976),
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Ehlers (1981), and Malament (1986a).
A.1 Preliminary denitions
We begin by dening the geometrical structures we will work with. First we will describe
GR.
Denition A.1 A relativistic spacetime is an ordered pair (M; gab), where M is a smooth,
connected, four-dimensional manifold and gab is a smooth, non-degenerate semi-Riemannian
metric on M with Lorentz signature (+; ; ; ).
In a relativistic spacetime, the metric denes a lightcone structure at every point as follows.
Given any point p and any vector a in the tangent space Mp, we say that 
a is timelike if
gab
ab > 0, spacelike if gab
ab < 0, and null if gab
ab = 0. The length of any vector a at a
point is given by jjajj = jgababj1=2. A (smooth)36 curve is timelike (resp. spacelike or null)
if its tangent vector is at every point of the curve. A spacetime is temporally orientable if
there exists a continuous timelike vector eld on all of M ; such a vector eld determines a
temporal orientation. If a relativistic spacetime has a temporal orientation, then it is possible
to consistently distinguish between future- and past-directed timelike vector elds. In what
follows, we assume all relativistic spacetimes have a temporal orientation.
Since the metric is non-degenerate, there exists an inverse metric gab such that gangnb =
ab. We can move easily between vector elds and covector elds on M by \raising" and
\lowering" indices with gab and gab, respectively, so for instance if 
a is a vector eld on M ,
then b = gab
a is a covector eld on M , and likewise for more complicated tensor elds.
The metric determines a unique derivative operator on M , ra, satisfying the compatibility
condition ragbc = 0. The derivative operator allows us to dene the curvature of spacetime
via the Riemann curvature tensor, which is the unique smooth tensor eld Rabcd such that for
all smooth vector elds b, Rabcd
b =  2r[crd]a. We say that a spacetime is at if Rabcd = 0.
From the Riemann curvature tensor, we can dene the Ricci tensor by Rab = R
n
abn.
36Here and in what follows, it should be assumed that we are limiting attention to smooth (i.e. innitely
dierentiable) curves, elds, manifolds, etc., whether stated explicitly or not.
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Massive point particles are represented by their worldlines, which are smooth future-
directed timelike curves parametrized by arc-length. (Point particles have an attenuated
status here|really, we are thinking of a eld theory, and point particles are some appropriate
idealization.) With every point particle, there is an associated four-momentum, P a, dened
at every point of the particle's worldline, whose length is the (inertial) rest mass. For a
point particle with non-zero mass mI ,37 we can write P a = mIa, where a is the tangent
vector eld to the particle's worldline (called the particle's four-velocity). The acceleration
of a particle's wordline, nrna, is determined by the relation F a = mInrna, where F a
represents the external forces acting on the particle; in the absence of forces, massive test
point particles traverse timelike geodesics. More generally, we can associate with any matter
eld a smooth symmetric eld T ab, called the energy-momentum tensor. T ab can be thought
to encode the four-momentum density of the matter eld as determined by any future-
directed timelike observer at a point: For all points p 2 M and all unit, future-directed
timelike vectors at p, a, the four-momentum of a matter eld at p as determined by a
is P a = T ab
b. The curvature of spacetime is related to the energy-momentum tensor by
Einstein's equation,
Rab = 8(Tab   1
2
Tgab); (A.1)
where T = T aa.
We can now proceed to dene a parallel structure for classical theories.
Denition A.2 A classical spacetime is an ordered quadruple (M; tab; h
ab;r), where M is
a smooth, connected, four-dimensional manifold; tab is a smooth symmetric eld on M of
signature (1; 0; 0; 0); hab is a smooth symmetric eld on M of signature (0; 1; 1; 1); and r
is a derivative operator on M compatible with tab and h
ab, i.e. it satises ratbc = 0 and
rahbc = 0. We additionally require that tab and hab are orthogonal, i.e. tabhbc = 0.
37Since keeping track of the distinction between inertial and gravitational mass is important for the ultimate
moral of the present discussion, I will label masses as inertial even in the context of GR and geometrized
Newtonian gravitation, were strictly speaking there can be no ambiguity. In keeping with the notation from
the body of the paper, I will use capitalized calligraphic symbols for subscripts indicating labels to distinguish
them from subscripts indicating index (i.e. tensor) structure. So, I will be used to indicate \inertial" and G
to indicate \gravitational."
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Note that \signature," here, has been extended to cover the degenerate case. We can see
immediately from the signatures of tab and h
ab that neither is invertible. Hence in general
neither tab nor h
ab can be used to raise and lower indices.
tab can be thought of as a temporal metric on M in the sense that given any vector 
a
in the tangent space at a point, p, jjajj = (tabab)1=2 is the temporal length of a at that
point. If the temporal length of a is positive, a is timelike; otherwise, it is spacelike. At
any point, it is possible to nd a covector ta, unique up to a sign, such that tab = tatb. If
there is a continuous, globally dened vector eld ta such that at every point, tab = tatb, then
the spacetime is temporally orientable (we will encode the assumption that a spacetime is
temporally oriented by replacing tab with ta in our denitions of classical spacetimes). h
ab,
meanwhile, can be thought of as a spatial metric. However, since there is no way to lower
the indices of hab, we cannot calculate the spatial length of a vector directly. Instead, we rely
on the fact that if a is a spacelike vector (as dened above), then there exists a covector
a such that 
a = habb. The spatial length of 
a can then be dened as (habab)
1=2. (This
spatial length is independent of the choice of a; if 
a is not a spacelike vector, then there
is no way to assign it a spatial length.) Note, too, that it is possible to dene the Riemann
curvature tensor Rabcd and the Ricci tensor Rab with respect to r as in GR (or rather, as
in dierential geometry generally). Flatness (Rabcd = 0) carries over intact from GR; we say
a classical spacetime is spatially at if Rabcd = Ranmqh
bnhcmhdq = 0. It turns out that this
latter condition is equivalent to Rab = hanhbmRnm = 0.
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We describe matter in close analogy with GR. Massive point particles are again repre-
sented by their worldlines, which are smooth future-directed timelike curves parameterized
by elapsed time. For a point particle with (inertial) mass mI , we can always dene a smooth
unit vector eld a tangent to its worldline, again called the four-velocity, such that we can
dene a four-momentum eld P a = mIa. The mass of the particle is now given by the
temporal length of its four-momentum. In similar analogy to the relativistic case, we can as-
38See Malament (2010, Prop. 4.15).
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sociate with any matter eld a smooth symmetric eld T ab, now called the mass-momentum
tensor. T ab once again encodes the four-momentum density of the matter eld as determined
by a future directed timelike observer at a point, but in this case all observers agree on the
four-momentum density at p: P a = tbT
ab. Contracting once more with tb yields the mass
density,  = tatbT
ab.
In the present covariant, four-dimensional language, standard Newtonian theory can be
expressed as follows. Let (M; ta; h
ab;r) be a classical spacetime. We require that r is at
(i.e. Rabcd = 0). We begin by considering the dynamics of a test point particle with inertial
mass mI and four-velocity a. As in GR, the force on a particle is related to the acceleration
of its worldine by F a = mIarab (literally, F = mIa). In the absence of external forces, a
massive test point particle undergoes geodesic motion. If the total mass-momentum content
of spacetime is described by T ab, we require that the conservation condition holds, i.e. at
every point raT ab = 0. To add gravitation to the theory, we can represent the gravitational
potential as a smooth scalar eld ' on M . ' is required to satisfy Poisson's equation,
rara' = 4 (where ra is shorthand for habrb). Gravitation is considered a force; in
general, the gravitational force on a point particle is moderated by its gravitational mass,
according to F aG =  mGra'. (Indeed, this relationship can be taken as a denition of the
gravitational mass.)
In geometrized Newtonian theory we again begin with a classical spacetime (M; ta; h
ab;r),
but now we allow r to be curved. The dynamics of a point particle with inertial mass mI
and four-velocity a are again given by F a = mInrna; likewise, free massive test point
particles undergo geodesic motion. However, the geodesics are now determined relative to r,
which is not necessarily at. The conservation condition is again expected to hold. Gravita-
tion is no longer a force and so there is no longer a \gravitational mass" term in the theory.
Instead, gravitational interactions are seen to be the result of the curvature of spacetime,
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which in turn is determined by a geometrized form of Poisson's equation,
Rab = 4tatb: (A.2)
Since the Riemann curvature tensor (and by extension, the Ricci tensor) is determined
by r, the geometrized Poisson's equation places a constraint on the derivative operator.
In particular, r must be such that, for all smooth vector elds a, Raba =  2r[brn]n =
4tatb
a. Note, too, that the geometrized Poisson's equation forces spacetime to be spatially
at, because if Poisson's equation holds, then Rab = 4hanhbmtntm = 0 by the orthogonality
condition on the metrics.
A.2 Relations between the theories
We are particularly interested in the relationship between these three theories. Several
results are available. First, it is always possible to \geometrize" a gravitational eld on
a at classical spacetime|that is, we can always move from the covariant formulation of
standard Newtonian gravitation to geometrized Newtonian gravitation, via a result due to
Andrzej Trautman (1965).
Proposition A.3 (Trautman Geometrization Lemma.) (Slightly modied fromMala-
ment, 2010, Prop. 4.2.1.) Let (M; ta; h
ab;
f
r) be a at classical spacetime. Let ' and 
be smooth scalar elds on M satisfying Poisson's equation,
f
ra
f
r a' = 4. Finally, let
g
r = (
f
r; Cabc),39 with Cabc =  tbtc
f
r a'. Then (M; ta; hab;
g
r) is a classical spacetime;
g
r is
the unique derivative operator on M such that given any timelike curve with tangent vector
eld a,
n
g
rna = 0, n
f
rna =  
f
r a'; (G)
39This notation is explained in Malament (2010, Prop. 1.7.3). Briey, if r is a derivative operator on M ,
then any other derivative operator on M is determined relative to r by a smooth symmetric (in the lower
indices) tensor eld, Cabc, and so specifying the C
a
bc eld and r is sucient to uniquely determine a new
derivative operator.
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and the Riemann curvature tensor relative to
g
r,
g
R abcd, satises
g
Rab = 4tatb (CC1)
g
Rab
c
d =
g
Rcd
a
b (CC2)
g
Rabcd = 0: (CC3)
Trautmann showed that it is also possible to go in the other direction. That is, given a
curved classical spacetime, it is possible to recover a at classical spacetime and a gravita-
tional eld, '|so long as the curvature conditions (CC1)-(CC3) are met.
Proposition A.4 (Trautman Recovery Theorem.) (Slightly modied from Malament,
2010, Prop. 4.2.5.) Let (M; ta; h
ab;
g
r) be a classical spacetime that satises eqs. (CC1)-
(CC3) for some smooth scalar eld . Then, at least locally on M , there exists a smooth
scalar eld ' and a at derivative operator on M ,
f
r, such that (M; ta; hab;
f
r) is a classical
spacetime; (G) holds; and ' and
f
r together satisfy Poisson's equation,
f
ra
f
r a' = 4.
It is worth pointing out that the pair (
f
r; ') is not unique. It is also worth pointing out
that whenever we begin with standard Newtonian theory and move to geometrized Newto-
nian theory, it is always possible to move back to the standard theory, because Prop. A.3
guarantees that the curvature conditions (CC1)-(CC3) are satised.
We can now ask how either of these classical theories relate to GR. The answer is that
geometrized Newtonian theory arises as a limiting case of GR, for a properly constructed
limit. (For full details of this limiting procedure, see Malament (1986a, Sec. 5).) Intuitively,
we will begin with a relativistic spacetime, and then allow the lightcone structure at every
point to open in such a way that, in the limit, the lightcones at every point become degen-
erate. Since the lightcone structure in a sense determines the speed of light, allowing the
lightcones to widen in this fashion captures a sense in which one might allow the speed of
light to go to innity.
To motivate what follows, it is useful to see how the limit works in detail in so-called
Minkowski spacetime, which is a relativistic spacetime (M; gab) in which (a)M is the manifold
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R4, (b) gab is at, and (c) the manifold and the derivative operator associated with gab
together are geodesically complete. In this case, we can write the metric at any point as a
matrix in terms of standard coordinates (t; x; y; z) and a constant c, the speed of light, as
gab(c) = Diag(1; 1=c2; 1=c2; 1=c2). Because of the special properties of Minkowski space,
it makes sense to speak of the lightcone widening uniformly around the xed t axis at all
points. The metric has a well dened limit as c!1, which can be expressed at any point
p as, limc!1 gab(c) = Diag(1; 0; 0; 0) = tab, where tab is a suggestively named degenerate
metric on M with (generalized) signature (1; 0; 0; 0). The inverse metric gab(c) does not
itself have a well-dened limit, but if we rescale it as gab(c)=c2, it does. In this case, we nd,
limc!1 gab(c)=c2 = Diag(0; 1; 1; 1) =  hab, where now hab is a degenerate metric on M
with signature (0; 1; 1; 1). So in Minkowski space, we can recover the metrical structure of
classical spacetime simply by allowing the speed of light to diverge.
In a general spacetime, however, we cannot assume that the metric will behave so nicely|
for instance, if space is curved, we do not even know if there is a global coordinate system in
which we can write the metric at an arbitrary point. So we proceed more carefully. Consider
a manifold M admitting a one-parameter family of nondegenerate Lorentz metrics gab()
(where  ranges over some interval (0; k)  R) that satisfy two conditions:
(Lim1) lim!0 gab() = tatb for some non-vanishing closed eld ta;40
(Lim2) lim!0 gab() =  hab for some eld hab of signature (0; 1; 1; 1).
For any  2 (0; k), we can associate with gab() the unique covariant derivative operator
compatible with gab(),

r, as well as the Ricci curvature tensor associated with

r,

Rab.
Thus the one-parameter family of metrics generates a one-parameter family of compatible
derivative operators and curvature tensors. Suppose further that, for any  2 (0; k), we can
dene a smooth symmetric eld T ab() that together with gab() and its associated Ricci
tensor satisfy:
40If ta is a non-vanishing closed eld, the product tab = tatb automatically has signature (1; 0; 0; 0).
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(Lim3) For all  2 (0; k),

Rab = 8
 
Tab()  12gab()T ()

, where T () = Tab()g
ab(); and
(Lim4) lim!0 T ab() = T ab for some smooth symmetric eld T ab on M .
When these conditions hold, it is possible to show that in the limit as ! 0, the family
of relativistic spacetimes (M; gab()) converges to a classical spacetime on which T
ab and
Rab satisfy the geometrized Poisson equation, Eq. (A.2). This result can be formulated as
follows:
Proposition A.5 (Classical Limit of GR.) (Adapted from Malament, 1986a, Props. on
Limits 1 & 2) Fix a smooth, connected, four-dimensional manifold M and assume  is a real-
valued variable taking all values on an interval (0; k). Suppose that for each  on an interval
(0; k), there exist smooth symmetric elds gab() and Tab() on M such that (M; gab()) is a
relativistic spacetime and for each , gab() and Tab() collectively satisfy conditions (Lim1)-
(Lim4). Then there exists a derivative operator ra on M such that lim!0

ra = ra, 41 and
for which (M; ta; h
ab;ra) is a classical spacetime satisfying Rabcd = Rcdab. Moreover, there
exists a smooth eld  on M such that lim!0 Tab() = tatb, which satises Rab = 4tatb.
Prop. A.5 gives the precise sense in which geometrized Newtonian gravitation is a limiting
case of GR.
A.3 Gravitational Mass in Newtonian Theory
We have now done sucient groundwork to oer a technically precise formulation of the
explanation given in the body of the paper. The argument was that by beginning with GR
and then moving in the limit to standard Newtonian theory, one nds that a massive point
particle's coupling to the gravitational eld is given by its inertial mass. This limit proceeds
in two steps. First, using Prop. A.5, one shows that geometrized Newtonian gravitation is
a limiting case of GR. Prop. A.4, meanwhile, shows that when three curvature conditions,
(CC1)-(CC3), are satised, we can recover (covariant) standard Newtonian theory from
41What does it mean for a sequence of derivative operators to converge? Suppose that ~ra is a xed
auxiliary derivative operator on M . Then for each

ra, there is a smooth symmetric eld Cabc() such that

ra = ( ~ra; Cabc()). Now suppose that there is another derivative operator on M , ra = ( ~ra; Cabc). We can
say that lim!0

ra = ra if lim!0 Cabc() = Cabc.
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geometrized Newtonian theory. It is in the course of executing this two step process that
one is forced to associate gravitational and inertial mass.
There is an important subtlety here. To connect Props. A.4 and A.5 and show that we
can recover standard Newtonian theory as a limit from GR, we need to show that the clas-
sical spacetime we reach in the limit from GR in fact meets the three curvature conditions
necessary to recover the standard theory. Prop. A.5 gives that two of the curvature con-
ditions, (CC1) and (CC2), are satised automatically. But what about (CC3), Rabcd = 0?
In general, Rabcd need not vanish in a classical spacetime reached in the limit from GR. It
turns out that there is a more general recovery theorem, due to Hans-Peter Kunzle (1976)
and Jurgen Ehlers (1981), that holds when Rabcd 6= 0. But the theory that you recover
in this case is not standard Newtonian gravitation|it is a non-geometrized generalization
of standard Newtonian gravitational theory in which the gravitational potential eld is re-
placed by a vector eld and there is an additional contribution to the force law for a particle
arising from a kind of universal rotation. The third curvature condition is sucient to guar-
antee that this rotational contribution vanishes and that the gravitational vector eld can
be written as the covariant derivative of a scalar potential.
There are several circumstances under which one can guarantee that the condition Rabcd is
satised.42 But for present purposes, establishing when the condition holds is unnecessary.
The important point is that condition (CC3) is both a necessary and sucient condition
for recovery of standard Newtonian physics via Prop. A.4. This is not a problem for the
explanation, per se, since insofar as we can recover standard Newtonian theory at all, we
can do so only from the class of families of relativistic spacetimes that converge to classical
spacetimes satisfying (CC3). In other words, in order for the explanation I propose to
succeed, one needs to assume a special curvature condition that is not otherwise guaranteed
to hold in the limit from GR|but this curvature condition is just what one need to assume
in order to recover standard Newtonian theory in the rst place.
42For instance, Rabcd is automatically satised in a classical spacetime that is, in a certain precise sense,
\asymptotically at" (See Malament, 2010, Sec. 4.5 for details).
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I can now state the precise claim, the proof of which amount to the formal explanation.
Proposition A.6 Let (M; ta; h
ab;
f
r) be a at classical spacetime and let ' be a gravitational
eld dened on that spacetime as in standard Newtonian gravitation. Suppose further that
(M; ta; h
ab;
f
r) and ' arise via the two-step limiting process just described (which is only
possible if the intermediate curved classical spacetime satises (CC3)). Consider a mas-
sive point particle with inertial mass mI traversing a timelike curve in M , , with tangent
vector eld a, under the inuence of only gravitational force. Then the gravitational force
experienced by the massive point particle is
F aG = mI
n
f
rna =  mI
f
ra': (A.3)
In other words, the particle's gravitational mass is equal to its inertial mass.
Proof. By assumption, (M; ta; h
ab;
f
r) and ' arise via the two-step limiting process described
above. Thus there exists a (curved) classical spacetime (M; ta; h
ab;
g
r) satisfying (CC3) from
which (M; ta; h
ab;
f
r) can be recovered. Since the particle experiences no non-gravitational
force, we know from the geodesic principle of geometrized Newtonian gravitation that  must
be a geodesic relative to
g
r. Meanwhile, by Prop. A.4, we know that if  is a geodesic relative
to
g
r, then n
f
rna =  
f
ra'. Thus we have the acceleration of the particle's worldline, which
we can plug into F a = mIn
f
rna to nd the gravitational force on the particle. We see
that F aG = mI
n
f
rna =  mI
f
ra', as required. It follows that the particle's coupling to the
gravitational eld is given by its inertial mass. 
References
Batterman, Robert (2002). The Devil in the Details. New York: Oxford University Press.
Cartan, Elie (1923). \Sur les varietes a connexion ane, et la theorie de la relativite
generalisee (premiere partie)." Annales scientiques de l' Ecole Normale Superieure, 40,
325{412.
Cartan, Elie (1924). \Sur les varietes a connexion ane, et la theorie de la relativite
generalisee (premiere partie) (suite)." Annales scientiques de l' Ecole Normale Superieure,
41, 1{25.
Cartwright, Nancy (1983). How the Laws of Physics Lie. New York: Oxford University
Press.
33
Ehlers, Jurgen (1981). \Uber den Newtonschen Grenzwert der Einsteinschen Gravitations-
theorie." Grundlagen Probleme der Modernen Physik, Ed. Jurgen Nitsch, Joachim Pfarr,
and Ernst-Walther Stachow. Zurich: Bibliographisches Institut.
Einstein, Albert (1920). Relativity: The Special and General Theory. Ed. Robert W. Lawson.
New York: Henry Holt and Co.
Fisher, Ronald Aylmer (1930). The genetical theory of natural selection. Oxford: Clarendon
Press.
Friedrichs, Kurt O. (1927). \Eine Invariante Formulierun des Newtonschen Gravitationsge-
setzes und der Grenzuberganges vom Einsteinschen zum Newtonschen Gesetz." Mathe-
matische Annalen, 98, 566{575.
Geroch, Robert (1978). General Relativity from A to B. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
Godfrey-Smith, Peter (2003). Theory and Reality. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Hempel, Carl and Paul Oppenheim (1948). \Studies in the Logic of Explanation." Philosophy
of Science, 15, 135{175.
Kitcher, Philip (1989). \Explanatory Unication and the Causal Structure of the World."
Scientic Explanation, Ed. Philip Kitcher and Wesley Salmon. Minneapolis: University
of Minnesota Press.
Kuhn, Thomas S. (1977). \Concepts of Cause in the Development of Physics." The Essential
Tension. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 21{30.
Kunzle, H. P. (1976). \Covariant Newtonian Limit of Lorentz Space-Times." General
Relativity and Gravitation, 7 (5), 445{457.
Malament, David (1986a). \Newtonian Gravity, Limits, and the Geometry of Space." From
Quarks to Quasars, Ed. Robert Colodny. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
Malament, David (1986b). \Gravity and Spatial Geometry." Logic, Methodology and Philos-
ophy of Science, Ed. Ruth Barcan Marcus, George Dorn, and Paul Weingartner. Volume
VII. New York: Elsevier Science Publishers. 405{411.
Malament, David B. (2010). \Relativistic and Newtonian Spacetime Struc-
ture." Most recent version available at http://www.lps.uci.edu/home/fac-
sta/faculty/malament/FndsofGR/.
Nagel, Ernest (1961). The Structure of Science. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World.
Nagel, Ernest (1970). \Issues in the Logic of Reductive Explanations." Mind, Science, and
History, Ed. Howard E. Kiefer and Milton K. Munitz. Albany, NY: State University of
New York Press.
34
Nickles, Thomas (1973). \Two Concepts of Intertheoretic Reduction." Journal of Philosophy,
70 (7), 181{201.
Odom, B., D. Hanneke, B. D'Urso, and G. Gabrielse (2006). \New Measurement of the
Electron Magnetic Moment Using a One-Electron Quantum Cyclotron." Physical Review
Letters, 97 (3), 030801.
Sachs, Mendel (1976). \On the Logical Status of Equivalence Principles in General Relativity
Theory." British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 27 (3), 225{229.
Salmon, Wesley (1984). Scientic Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Salmon, Wesley (1989). \Four Decades of Scientic Explanation." Scientic Explanation,
Ed. Philip Kitcher and Wesley Salmon. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Skyrms, Brian (1996). Evolution of the Social Contract. New York: Cambridge University
Press.
Strevens, Michael (2004). \The Causal and Unication Approaches to Explanation Unied{
Causally." Nous, 38 (1), 154{176.
Strevens, Michael (2008). Depth: An Account of Scientic Explanation. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
Trautman, Andrzej (1965). \Foundations and Current Problem of General Relativity."
Lectures on General Relativity, Ed. Stanley Deser and Kenneth W. Ford. Englewood
Clis, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Weinberg, Steven (1972). Gravitation and Cosmology. New York: Wiley.
Woodward, James (2003). Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
35
